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The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine
in Pennsylvania: Uncertainty in the
Courts
I. Introduction
The lesser included offense doctrine allows a jury to convict a
defendant of a crime for which he was not indicted.' The essence of
the doctrine is that two crimes of greater and lesser penalty may be
so closely related that an indictment for the greater offense provides
sufficient notice to the defendant that he may have to defend against
the less serious offense 2 Basically, a lesser included offense exists
when some of the elements of the crime charged in the indictment
constitute a separate crime that carries a lower penalty.3
The lesser included offense doctrine originated at common law
as an aid to the prosecution in cases in which the evidence failed to
establish some element of the offense initially charged.4 The doc-
trine developed to the extent that currently defendants are indisputa-
I. Generally, a court cannot convict a defendant of a crime for which the grand jury did
not file an indictment. Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure require an
indictment to define all the issues at trial. 19 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 213(c) (Purdon Supp.
1979). The same requirement applies for informations. Id § 225(d). Additionally, the Consti-
tution of the United States and the Pennsylvania Constitution provide the accused the right to
know the nature and cause of the accusation against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; PA. CONST.
art. [1], § 9.
The fifth amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment for a capital offense, how-
ever, has not been applied to state criminal defendants through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972). Due process does
require that a defendant have notice of the charges against him so that he may have an oppor-
tunity to defend. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25, 28 (1972). The indictment or information supplies the essential due process require-
ment of notice. Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763 (1962); Mildwoff v. Cunningham,
432 F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117
(1974) (indictment to be sufficient must fairly inform defendant of the charge he must defend).
2. Walker v. United States, 418 F.2d 1116, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The indictment is,
for legal purposes, sufficient notice to the defendant that he may be called to defend the lesser
included charge"); Mildwoff v. Cunningham, 432 F. Supp. 814, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("It is
axiomatic that an indictment for one crime carries with it notice that lesser offenses included
within the specified crime are also charged and must be defended against").
3. For instance, a person is guilty of robbery if in the course of committing a theft he
inflicts serious bodily injury upon another. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701(a)(l)(i), 3921(a)
(Purdon Supp. 1978). Theft and aggravated assault are crimes included within the offense of
robbery. See id § 2702(a)(1).
4. See, e.g., Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 437 n.5, 378 A.2d 1189, 1193 n.5 (1977) (opinion announcing the judg-
ment of the court).
bly entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense,5 provided
the instruction is warranted.6 The Supreme Court of the United
States avoided directly confronting the issue, but suggested that the
denial of a proper lesser included offense instruction violates a de-
fendant's fifth amendment due process rights.7
The doctrine is a valuable tool for defendant, prosecutor, and
society. From a defendant's point of view, it provides the jury with
an alternative to a guilty verdict on the greater offense.' From the
prosecutor's viewpoint, a defendant may not go free if the evidence
fails to prove an element essential to a finding of guilt on the greater
offense. Society may receive a benefit because, in the latter situation,
courts may release fewer defendants acquitted of the greater offense.
In addition, the punishment society inflicts on a criminal may con-
form more accurately to the crime actually committed if a verdict on
a lesser included offense is permissible.
This comment briefly surveys the various lesser included offense
theories applied in the United States and examines the present status
and application of the doctrine in Pennsylvania.9 The inherent diffi-
culty in application of the doctrine has "challenged the effective ad-
ministration of criminal justice for centuries."'" Complex and
contradictory proclamations by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
5. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973).
6. Although no Pennsylvania cases address the issue, a defendant's entitlement to an
instruction is at least equal, if not greater than, that of the prosecution. In Kelly v. United
States, 370 F.2d 227, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the court held a defendant's right to invoke a lesser
included offense does not extend beyond the prosecutor's right. The principle enunciated by
the Kelly court was termed the principle of mutuality in United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d
314, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In that case the court progressed beyond the principle of mutuality
and stated that "[diespite the patina of antiquity, considerations of justice and good judicial
administration warrant dispensing with mutuality as an essential prerequisite to the defense's
right to a lesser included offense charge." The Supreme Court of the United States failed to
adopt the Whitaker court's conclusion. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 214 n.14 (1973).
7. "[W]hile we have never explicitly held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment guarantees the right of a defendant to have the jury instructed on a lesser in-
cluded offense, it is nevertheless clear that ...to preclude such an instruction would raise
difficult constitutional questions." Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 213 (1973). Accord
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 455 n.2a, 378 A.2d 1199, 1202 n.2a (1977) (plurality
opinion) (abandonment of the lesser included offense doctrine would pose constitutional diffi-
culties because it helps to promote fairness in criminal trials). But see id. at 476, 378 A.2d at
1213 (Nix, J., dissenting) (the court is not bound by any constitutional restrictions when deal-
ing with lesser included offenses).
8. [I]t is no answer to petitioner's demand for a jury instruction on a lesser offense
to argue that a defendant may be better off without such an instruction. True, if the
prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the of-
fense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theo-
retical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is entitled to a lesser
offense instruction-in this context or any other-precisely because he should not be
exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice will diverge from theory.
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212 (1973).
9. One Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice recently stated that "there is no Penn-
sylvania statute, rule, or case which adequately sets forth the standards for determining what is
a lesser included defense." Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 460, 378 A.2d 1199, 1205
(1977) (plurality opinion).
10. Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 377, 380 (Fla. 1968).
and inconsistent application by the Pennsylvania Superior Court add
confusion to the use of the doctrine, so that neither the courts nor the
bar have an accurate guide for identifying a lesser included offense."
II. Lesser Included Offense Theories in the United States
Three basic approaches to lesser included offenses exist among
jurisdictions in the United States.12 Because the approaches overlap
to some extent and because none of the approaches are exclusive of
each other, several jurisdictions subscribe to more than one ap-
proach.
13
A. Pleadings or Cognate Theory
When the accusatory pleadings, in charging the indicted offense,
describe another, less serious offense, a lesser included offense ex-
ists. 14 For example, if an indictment for aggravated assault describes
the use of a pistol as the means of the assault, 15 an instruction and a
verdict on a weapons offense are proper.' 6 Commentators alterna-
tively term this approach the pleadings or cognate theory because it
does not require a lesser crime to be a constituent part of the greater
crime; the lesser crime need only so relate to the greater that the
II. "My quarrel with today's decision [concerning lesser included offenses] . . . is over
the Court's failure to provide the trial courts and the bar with some consistent guidance in the
resolution of these difficult issues." Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 290, 393 A.2d 660,
668 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
12. This comment does not present an exhaustive analysis of the various case law in all
jurisdictions. For more detailed investigation of lesser included offense approaches see Bar-
nett, The Lesser-Included Offense Doctrine- .4 Present Day Analysisfor Practitioners, 5 CONN.
L. REV. 255 (1972); George, Lesser Included Offenses in Michigan, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 35;
Koenig, The Many-Headed Hydra of Lesser Included Offenses: .4 Herculean Task/or the Michi-
gan Courts, 1975 DET. C.L. REV. 41; Comment, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Iowa-
The Gordian Knot Untied, 59 IOWA L. REV. 684 (1974); Comment, The Lesser Included Offense
Instruction - Problems With Its Use, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 587 (1968); Note, Lesser In-
cluded Offenses in Kansas, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 40 (1976).
13. See, e.g., People v. Bembroy, 4 Ill. App. 3d 522, 281 N.E.2d 389 (1972) (evidence and
strict statutory approach); State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973) (pleadings and evi-
dence theory).
14. In re Maricopa County, Ill Ariz. 103, 523 P.2d 1304, 1306 (1974). See, e.g., People
v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379, 105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 503 P.2d 585 (1972) (lesser offense is necessarily
included if it is within the offense specifically charged in the accusatory pleading, as distin-
guished from the statutory definition of the crime); People v. Cooke, 186 Colo. 44, 525 P.2d
426 (1974); State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A.2d 547 (1972); People v. Lyons, 26 111. App. 3d
193, 324 N.E.2d 677, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1036 (1975); Padgett v. State, -Ind. App.-, 380
N.E.2d 96 (1978).
15. In Pennsylvania, an indictment for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon could
read, in pertinent part, that the accused "did intentionally cause bodily injury to [the victim]
by the intentional use of a deadly weapon, [a pistol .... ]" 19 ANDERSON'S PURDON'S PA.
FORMS, Rule 226, Form 44 (1977).
16. See, e.g.. Padgett v. State, -Ind. App.-, 380 N.E.2d 96 (1978) (although aggravated
assault and battery is not analytically a necessarily included offense of assault and battery with
intent to kill, it will become an included offense if the requisite harm is alleged in the indict-
ment); Commonwealth v. Stots, 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 324 A.2d 480 (1974) ("Willfully and
wantonly pointing a pistol" is a lesser included offense of "attempt with intent to kill" when
the indictment fairly puts defendant on notice of the lesser charge).
indictment contain the lesser. 7
The pleadings theory results in a broad range of possible lesser
included offenses. A defendant might claim that because the lesser
offense is not a constituent part of the greater offense, he would not
know which lesser crime to defend.' 8 Because the indictment specifi-
cally describes the lesser offense, however, the defendant cannot suc-
cessfully claim lack of notice to defend.' 9
B. Statutory Theory
The statutory theory of lesser included offenses has two facets-
a factual elements, or evidence approach,2" and a legal elements, or
strict statutory2' approach. In both approaches the lesser offense
must necessarily be included in the greater offense under the applica-
ble statutes. A crime is necessarily included in another when some
of the elements of the greater offense encompass all the elements of
the lesser offense. Thus, the greater cannot be committed without
committing the lesser.22
1. Evidencepproach.-Under the evidence approach to lesser
included offenses, if the evidence adduced at trial reveals the occur-
rence of a lesser crime that is necessarily included in a greater crime,
17. The concept of "lesser included" offenses is not always confined to those which
are "necessarily included", either by statutory definition or by reason of the facts in a
particular case, although the terms are frequently used interchangeably. Offenses
which are "lesser included" even though not "necessarily" in that category are some-
times called "cognate lesser included offenses."
Commonwealth v. Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 437 n.5, 378 A.2d 1189, 1193 n.5 (1977) (opinion
announcing the judgment of the court).
18. See notes 1-2 supra.
19. A logical consistency between the greater and lesser offense exists because the lesser
appears in the indictment as a constituent part of the occurrence of the greater. At least one
court, however, while not abandoning the pleadings theory, has limited its application to situa-
tions in which it is impossible "to commit the greater offense, in the manner described in the
information or bill of particulars, without having first committed the lesser." State v. Brown,
163 Conn. 52, -, 301 A.2d 547, 552 (1972).
20. The evidence approach is termed the majority view in Barnett, The Lesser-Included
Offense Doctrine A Present Day Analsisfor Practitioners, 5 CONN. L. REv. 255, 291 (1972).
A review of the cases, however, appears to indicate that the strict statutory approach represents
the majority view. See note 21 infra.
21. The strict statutory approach is termed the majority view in the commentary to
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
22. Conceptually related to the statutory theory is the "inherent relationship test" for
determining when a lesser included offense exists, which has been adopted by at least two
federal circuits. In United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court deter-
mined that a necessarily included test was antiquated and formulated the inherent relationship
test, which stated that the two offenses "must relate to protection of the same interests, and
must be so related that in the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably,
proof of the lesser is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the
greater offense." Id. at 319. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the inherent
relationship test in United States v. Stolarz, 550 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977). The court stated that
a definition of a "necessarily included" offense that required the impossibility of committing
the greater without committing the lesser offense was too mechanistic. As a result, the court
held that assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm was a lesser included
offense of assault with intent to commit murder.
an instruction on the lesser is proper.23 For example, if the evidence
at a trial for theft of an automobile reveals that the unlawful taking
occurred when the defendant drove the vehicle away, as opposed to
towing it away, with no intent to permanently deprive the owner of
the property, the court may instruct the jury on joyriding.
24
The evidence approach, because it focuses on the factual ele-
ments of an offense, entails an inquiry into the evidence adduced at
trial. A defendant may claim he has no advance notice of the lesser
included offense because the lesser offense was not revealed until
trial. Since the greater crime must encompass the lesser crime, how-
ever, a defendant cannot claim lack of notice to defend. As one
court stated, a lesser included offense under the evidence theory
"may be a crime which the evidence suggests and which could have
been included in the information. 25
2. Strict Statutory Approach.-Under the strict statutory ap-
proach, a lesser included offense occurs when one offense contains
all the legal elements of another, and more.26 Since this determina-
tion is made in the abstract, with reference only to the language of
the controlling statutes, theoretically a static number of lesser in-
cluded offenses exists. Because the theory is conceptual in nature,
however, inquiries into the relationship between the two statutes be-
come exercises in statutory interpretation. 27 The test "is not as sim-
ple as defining the elements of the two offenses separately and laying
23. See, e.g., People v. Bembroy, 4 111. App. 3d 522, 281 N.E.2d 389 (1972); State v.
Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973); Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973).
See also People v. Cionek, 43 App. Div. 2d 256, 351 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1974), in which the court
ruled that a New York statute, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW (McKinney) § 1.20(37), which provides
that a lesser included offense exists when it is impossible to commit a particular crime without
concomitantly committing a lesser offense, does not mean impossible under any circumstances,
but impossible under the particular facts of the case at trial. "The rule is one of reason ob-
tained from the study of the evidence. ... 43 App. Div. 2d at -, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
24. See Commonwealth v. Nace, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972) and notes
57-59 and accompanying text infra. Under a strict statutory approach, joyriding is not a lesser
included offense of theft of an automobile because other methods of theft of the vehicle exist.
25. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, -, 301 A.2d 547, 552 (1972).
26. "The [lesser included offense] test therefore appears to be whether all the essential
elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater." Commonwealth v. Farmer, 244 Pa.
Super. Ct. 334, 339, 368 A.2d 748, 750 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Carmona, 422 F.2d 95
(3d Cir. 1970) (lesser included offense must be comprised solely of some but not all of the
elements of the offense charged); People v. Cannady, 8 Cal. 3d 379, 105 Cal. Rptr. 129, 503
P.2d 585 (1972) (an offense is necessarily included when one offense cannot be committed
without committing another offense).
This test is often stated in terms of impossibility; if it is impossible to commit one offense
without concomitantly committing a second offense, the latter is a lesser included offense of the
former. See, e.g., Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1969) ("necessarily
included" means the lesser offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater
without committing the lesser). N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW (McKinney) §1.20(37) provides,
"When it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the
same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree, the latter is, with respect to the former,
a 'lesser included offense.'
27. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 289, 393 A.2d 660, 667 (1978) (dissenting
opinion by Pomeroy, J.): "I conclude that the legislature, despite inartful drafting, intended
29them side by side..., because borderline situations occur.
Because the statutory approach does not consider factual evi-
dence or pleadings, it is inherently inflexible. A court's interpreta-
tion of the language of a statute becomes more important than
operative facts and, perhaps, more important than the purpose of the
doctrine as an aid to both prosecution and defense.3" Because it is
the most inflexible approach, however, few due process notice objec-
tions are present.
C Model Penal Code Approach
Section 1.07(4) of the Model Penal Code3 employs three differ-
ent tests for identifying lesser included offenses. 32  The first corre-
sponds to the statutory approach. 33 The second incorporates attempt
and solicitation of a crime as a lesser included offense therein. At-
tempt and solicitation are not traditionally considered lesser in-
cluded offenses because they are not elements contained within the
crime charged.34 Nevertheless, Pennsylvania and most other juris-
dictions allow a conviction for attempt to commit the crime charged
in the indictment.35 The last test contained within Section 1.07(4)
that criminal trespass be regarded as a lesser included offense of burglary." See notes 104-15
and accompanying text infra.
28. United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 318 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
29. For instance, is unlawful possession of drugs for personal use an offense necessarily
included within possession of drugs with intent to distribute? Courts answering this inquiry
feel compelled to look not only at legislative intent, but also at whether one who distributes
drugs is likely to use them. See, e.g., United States v. Upthegrove, 504 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1974)
(affirmative answer); Hackett v. United States, 348 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1965) (negative answer).
30. For an example of a court enmeshed in a statutory interpretation problem, see Com-
monwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 393 A.2d 660 (1978), and notes 104-15 and accompanying
text infra.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) provides,
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the
indictment [or the information]. An offense is so included when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to estab-
lish the commission of the offense charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the offense charged or to com-
mit an offense otherwise included therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or
risk of injury to the same person, property or public interest or a lesser kind of
culpability suffices to establish its commission.
Id.
33. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(a) requires that the lesser offense must be necessarily
included within the greater offense. Whether the section utilizes an evidence or strict statutory
approach remains unclear. Although the section is written in terms of factual rather than legal
elements, Pennsylvania courts interpreted it to conform to the strict statutory approach. Com-
monwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 284 n.10, 393 A.2d 660, 665 n.10 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dis-
senting).
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4), Comment at 41 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). But cf.
Commonwealth v. White, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 176, 182, 335 A.2d 436, 438 (1975) (the "consum-
mated act of [an offense] cannot exist without first the attempt to commit" the offense). Solici-
tation, however, appears to be a distinct, substantive offense under Pennsylvania law.
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 219, 375 A.2d 66 (1977).
35. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 284 n.10, 393 A.2d 660, 665 n.10 (1978)
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting). In Commonwealth v. White, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 176, 181-82, 335
offers a novel approach to lesser included offenses and provides a
broad test for determining when a lesser included offense exists.
In order to satisfy the third test, the offenses need not be neces-
sarily included offenses. 36 The "lesser culpability" standard em-
ployed refers to offenses that are the same as the offense charged,
except that they require a less blameworthy state of mind.37 For ex-
ample, murder and manslaughter both entail killings, and the state
of mind required for manslaughter is less culpable than the state of
mind required for murder.38 The "less serious injury or risk of in-
jury" segment of the test refers to the situation in which the proof
fails to establish the degree of injury alleged. For example, when an
indictment charges homicide, but doubt exists whether the defend-
ant's blow caused the death of the victim, the prosecution or the de-
fense can request a lesser included offense instruction for assault and
battery.39
Few state criminal codes4° and few courts4 utilize the third ap-
proach. Perhaps courts and legislatures consider subsection (c) too
broad and, therefore, inimicable to due process notice requirements.
In a jurisdiction with a modern penal code, however, offenses that
differ only in terms of state of mind or of degree or risk of injury, are
likely to be clearly discernable within specific chapters.42 Of the few
courts that recognize Section 1.07(4)(c), none has suggested that it is
unconstitutionally broad.
III. Problems of Request and Evidence
A. Request for Lesser Included Offense Instruction
The vast majority ofjurisdictions in the United States follow the
A.2d 436, 438 (1975), the court stated that "neither the Crimes Code nor the Pennsylvania
Rules of Criminal Procedure contain any provision requiring a conviction of the substantive
offense, as distinguished from the attempt, when the indictment charges the actual offense."
See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW (McKinney) § 1.20(37).
36. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08 (4), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
37. Id at 41.
38. See Commonwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977) (plurality opinion).
39. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08(4), Comment at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
40. See ALA. CODE tit. 13A, § 13A-1-9 (1978); N.J. CODE OF CRIM. JUSTICE § 2c: 1-8(d)
(Approved Aug. 16, 1978; Effective Sept. 1, 1979). See also FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMES
CODE § 109(q) (1971).
41. See United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v.
Polimeni, 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977) (opinion announcing judgment of the court). For
a full discussion of Po/imeni see notes 84-92 and accompanying text infra.
42. The 1973 Crimes Code, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101-7505 (Purdon 1973), classi-
fies offenses of like nature in separate chapters, as do the penal codes of most jurisdictions.
Other than the penalty provided by the statute, usually all that distinguishes offenses within a
chapter is the intent of a defendant or the seriousness or level of risk inherent in a crime. Since
only at trial do the precise facts surrounding the case become manifest, the evidence may prove
that the defendant, although indicted for one crime, committed a related crime within the
same chapter. See text accompanying note 128 infra.
rule that failure of a court to give an instruction on a lesser included
offense is not error unless the instruction is requested by the defense
or prosecution. 3 Two reasons exist for this rule. First, lesser in-
cluded offenses are a matter of trial tactics. A lesser included offense
instruction benefits the prosecution when it is unable to establish an
element essential to a conviction for the crime charged. If, however,
the prosecution is confident that its proof is sufficient, it will not de-
sire an alternative verdict and will not request an instruction. A
lesser included offense instruction benefits a defendant by offering
the jury an alternative verdict and thus, a lesser punishment for the
defendant. If defense counsel believes an acquittal on the charged
offense is iminent, however, a request for a lesser included offense
instruction is not in his client's best interests. Second, the law places
the burden of recognizing and requesting an instruction for a lesser
included offense on prosecution or defense counsel, rather than on
the trial court, in order to avoid omissions that result in reversible
error. Inadvertent or discretionary failures by a trial court to charge
the jury on a lesser offense would undoubtedly result in numerous
appeals."
B. Rational Basis in the Evidence
The majority of jurisdictions also allow instructions for a lesser
included offense only when the evidence substantiates a rational be-
lief in a defendant's guilt of the lesser crime." The focus of this
inquiry is not only on the lesser offense, but includes the greater of-
fense; only when "it is rational for the jury to render a verdict of not
43. The only exception to the rule that the court need give a lesser included offense in-
struction only on request, results from a statutory requirement in one jurisdiction. FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.510 provides in pertinent part, "Upon an indictment or information upon which the
defendant is to be tried for any offense the jurors. . . may convict him of any offense which is
necessary [sic] included in the offense charged. The court shall charge the jury in this regard."
(emphasis added). See Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1968); Kimbrough v. State, 356 So.
2d 1294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
44. See United States ex rel Matthews v. Johnson, 503 F.2d 339, 345 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 952 (1975).
45. "[V]irtually every jurisdiction has agreed with this limitation on the jury's power by
holding that [a lesser included offense] instruction is to be given only if there is a rational basis
in the evidence for that verdict." Commonwealth v. Thomas, 482 Pa. 312, 324-25, 393 A.2d
1122, 1128 (1978) (equally divided court).
Only two jurisdictions do not require a rational basis in the evidence for all lesser in-
cluded offenses, and in both situations the exception is provided by statute. See FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 3.510, note 43 supra. Section 14.5 of LA. SrAT. ANN. (West 1974), provides in pertinent
pan: "An offender who commits an offense which includes all the elements of other lesser
offenses, may be prosecuted for and convicted of either the greater offense or the lesser and
included offenses." (emphasis added). The constitutionality of this statute was upheld in State
v. Madison, 319 So. 2d 912 (La. 1975) (due process challenge).
By reason of historical anomaly, Pennsylvania law does not require a rational basis in the
evidence for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter on an indictment for murder. See note 72
and accompanying text infra. Moreover, a faction of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court believes
no rational basis in the evidence should be required for a conviction of involuntary man-
slaughter on an indictment for murder. See note 102 infra.
guilty of the greater offense but guilty of the lesser," is the judge
required to grant the requested instruction.46 The law appears well
settled that requiring a defendant to demonstrate a rational basis in
the evidence does not violate his right to remain silent since defend-
ant can develop the requisite evidence through cross-examination,
production of witnesses, and challenges to the prosecutor's interpre-
tation of the evidence.47
Defendants' argument that evidence is a question of fact and
rightfully within the jury's province ignores the principle that a trial
court always determines the propriety of an instruction based on evi-
dence in the record.48  Permitting a jury to choose between two of-
fenses, without regard to evidence that supports a conviction, results
in the jury determining "the punishment to be imposed, a duty [the
legislature] has traditionally left to the judge."49
IV. The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Pennsylvania
A. The Traditional Approach
The lesser included offense doctrine in Pennsylvania is as old as
the common-law.5° The test traditionally used to determine when
one offense is included in another originated in a case defining the
merger doctrine-the greater offense must "necessarily" involve the
lesser. 5 ' Lesser included offense decisions adopted the merger test
because "the doctrines of merger and lesser included offenses raise
essentially the same question."'52 Although this test does no more
46. Commonwealth v. Wilds, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 288, 362 A.2d 273, 278 (1976). See,
e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(5) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
47. See, e.g., Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965): Commonwealth v. Thomas.
482 Pa. 312, 372, 393 A.2d 1122, 1129 (1978) (equally divided court); Commonwealth v.
Melnyczenko, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 203, 208, 358 A.2d 98, 100 (1976).
48. A determination of whether the evidence can rationally support a finding in-
volves no weighing of the evidence. Rather, the test is whether, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the defendant and resolving all questions of weight and
credibility in his favor, a conclusion that the [defendant committed the lesser in-
cluded offensel can be sustained.
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 482 Pa. 312, 327 n.13, 393 A.2d 1122, 1130 n.13 (1978) (equally
divided court). Accord, Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343 (1965); Berra v. United States,
351 U.S. 131 (1956); Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973).
49. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 350 n.6 (1965).
50. Dinkey v. Commonwealth, 17 Pa. 126, 129 (1851) (formulation of doctrine presented
without citation to controlling authority).
51. See Commonwealth ex rel. Moszczynski v. Ashe, 343 Pa. 102, 104, 21 A.2d 920, 921
(1941). See also Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 370 A.2d 712 (1977); Common-
wealth v. Nelson, 452 Pa. 275, 280, 305 A.2d 369, 371 (1973) (Nix, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
52. Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 191-92 n.4, 361 A.2d 746, 748
n.4 (1976).
Formerly, the common-law doctrine of merger barred successive prosecutions for differ-
ent crimes arising out of the same transaction when one crime was a lesser included offense of
the other. Commonwealth v. Comber, 374 Pa. 570, 97 A.2d 343 (1953). Adoption of compul-
sory joinder under the Crimes Code, however, resulted in the replacement of the common-law
merger doctrine. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § I 10(l)(i) (Purdon 1973). Section I 10(I)(i) bars a
subsequent prosecution for "any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on
than add the word "necessarily" to the formulation of the doctrine, it
brings lesser included offenses in Pennsylvania within the purview of
the statutory theory.53 Because the greater crime must "necessarily
involve" or include the lesser crime, any inquiry must focus on the
elements of the offenses.54 Thus, if some of the elements of crime X
encompass all the elements of crime Y, crime Y is necessarily in-
cluded in crime X.55
Although Pennsylvania courts have never explicitly stated the
rule, they traditionally apply a strict statutory approach and appar-
ently interpret the phrase "necessarily included" to require only a
comparison of the legal elements of the crimes.56 Without an ade-
quate rule to guide them, however, the courts apply the approach
inconsistently.
B. The Superior Court's Approach to Lesser Included Offenses
Although nominally following the strict statutory approach, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has embraced other theories. In Com-
monwealth v. Nace, " the grand jury indicted the defendant for auto-
mobile theft, but the court convicted him of operation of a motor
the first prosecution" when the former prosecution results in an acquittal or a conviction. Sec-
tion 110 encompasses lesser included offenses because it incorporates by reference Section
109(l) of Title 18, which states: "A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal
of the greater inclusive offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside." At the same
time that the legislature adopted the Crimes Code, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court exercised
its supervisory power to adopt the identical rule as a judicial principle. Commonwealth v.
Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A.2d 432 (1973), vacated and remanded, Pennsylvania v. Campana,
414 U.S. 808 (1973), on remand, Commonwealth v. Campana, 455 Pa. 622, 314 A.2d 854, cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 969 (1974). The compulsory joinder rule also replaces the common-law pleas
of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, which were pleas that defendant had previously been
tried for a lesser included offense of the offense charged and, thus, had impliedly been acquit-
ted of the greater offense. See generally Belsky, Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania, 78 DICK.
L. REv. 209, 288-297 (1973).
This comment focuses on lesser offenses as they arise in the same criminal proceeding and
does not consider lesser included offenses in subsequent proceedings. Proposals made herein
regarding reformulation of the lesser included offense rule affect compulsory joinder only so
far as those crimes that may be lesser included offenses.
53. See text accompanying notes 20-30 supra.
54. "The proper subsidiary test, for determining whether one offense necessarily involves
another, is whether all of the essential elements of the lesser offense are included in the
greater." Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 192, 361 A.2d 746, 748 (1976).
55. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 393 A.2d 660 (1978) (criminal tres-
pass is not a lesser included offense of burglary because it contains a scienter element which
burglary does not); Commonwealth v. Ackerman, 239 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 361 A.2d 746 (1976)
(felonious restraint is not an offense necessarily included within kidnapping because the lesser
crime requires serious bodily injury and the greater crime requires only bodily injury); Com-
monwealth v. Ruehling, 232 Pa. Super. Ct. 378, 334 A.2d 702 (1975) (indecent assault is not an
offense necessarily included within statutory rape because the lesser crime requires an offen-
sive or forceful act while the greater crime does not).
56. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 393 A.2d 660 (1978); Common-
wealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v.
Moore, 463 Pa. 317, 344 A.2d 850 (1975); Commonwealth v. Franklin, 248 Pa. Super. Ct. 145,
374 A.2d 1360 (1977); Commonwealth v. Wilds, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 362 A.2d 273 (1976).
57. 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972).
vehicle without consent of the owner-joyriding." The court ac-
knowledged that joyriding is not a necessarily included offense of
automobile theft because a thief can steal a vehicle without operat-
ing it. 59 Nevertheless, applying the evidence approach, the court al-
lowed the conviction to stand because the evidence demonstrated
that the defendant drove the vehicle away.6"
The decision in Commonwealth v. Jacobs6 reveals a similar in-
consistency. In that case, the court ruled the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support a verdict of burglary, but found sufficient evidence
in the record to show a criminal trespass.62 Because the court ruled
that criminal trespass was a lesser included offense of burglary, the
court remanded the case and directed entry of a verdict of guilty of
the lesser offense.63
Another recent case, Commonwealth v. Stots, 64 marked the em-
ployment of the pleadings theory. The grand jury indicted the de-
fendant for "attempt with intent to kill"65 and he was convicted of
"willfully and wantonly pointing a pistol."66 The defendant con-
tended that pointing a pistol was not an offense necessarily included
within attempt with intent to kill because the latter crime can be
committed without a handgun. The court inspected the accusatory
pleading, which described an attempt to shoot a loaded weapon, and
found the pleadings theory applicable.67 Because the indictment no-
58. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3921, 3928 (Purdon 1973).
59. The court, however, rationalized its departure from the "necessarily included" rule
by noting that it is a "rare case" when a vehicle is stolen by means other than being driven
away. 222 Pa. Super. Ct. at 332, 295 A.2d at 89. A vehicle could, however, be removed by
towing it or placing it on a flatbed.
60. Under the 1973 Crimes Code the precise problem presented in Commonwealth v.
Nace would not arise. Even though theft by unlawful taking and unauthorized use of
automobiles are still separate offenses, the Crimes Code has provided a consolidation of theft
offenses section. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3902 (Purdon 1973). This section, in effect, elimi-
nates the need for the lesser included offense doctrine as it applies to theft offenses. Although
this statute applies to several theft offenses that are only generically related, the result is the
same as treating all theft offenses as lesser included offenses of each other.
61. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 372 A.2d 873 (1977).
62. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3502 (Purdon 1973).
63. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 380, 372 A.2d at 876. The court based its finding that criminal
trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary on its ruling in Commonwealth v. Carter, 236
Pa. Super. Ct. 376, 344 A.2d 899 (1975). The ruling that criminal trespass is a lesser included
offense of burglary was overruled in Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274. 393 A.2d 660
(1978).
64. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. 279, 324 A.2d 480 (1974).
65. This crime is now encompassed within the aggravated assault section. 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 2702 (Purdon 1973).
66. This crime is now encompassed within the reckless endangerment section. Id
§ 2705. The present reckless endangermant section is a lesser included offense of both aggra-
vated assault and simple assault because all three speak in terms of recklessness and serious
bodily injury.
67. 227 Pa. Super. Ct. at 281, 324 A.2d at 481. Prior case law supports the court's hold-
ing. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nace, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 295 A.2d 87 (1972), discussed at
notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra. In Commonwealth v. Varner, 74 Pa. Super. Ct. 529
(1920), defendant was indicted for statutory rape and convicted of assault and battery with
intent to ravish. Although statutory rape can be committed without an assault and battery
tified the defendant that the Commonwealth's case required proof
that defendant pointed a firearm, he was not prejudiced by the con-
viction for the lesser crime.68
Thus, within a period of three years, the superior court utilized
two approaches to the lesser included offense doctrine that differed
from the strict statutory approach. This inconsistency of approach
deprives judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel of guidelines for de-
termining the existence of a lesser included offense and can result in
prejudicial error, impairment of defendant's due process rights, and
inability of counsel to prepare trial strategy. Judges need a precise
definition of the doctrine in order to issue correct instructions be-
cause failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense when
such instruction is proper may constitute prejudicial error.69 The
failure to follow a consistent approach hampers a prosecutor because
on a weak case he desires a lesser included offense instruction, and
on a strong case he wishes to argue against the propriety of an in-
struction. A consistently applied doctrine is most crucial to the de-
fendant. If a court grants the prosecutor's request for a charge on a
lesser included offense and that instruction is improper, the result is
an impairment of defendant's due process rights of notice and op-
portunity to defend.7" Unfortunately, decisions by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court do not clarify the dilemma.
C Supreme Court Application of the Lesser Included Offense
Doctrine
Few lesser included offense cases reach the supreme court level
except those within the continuing controversy over the status of
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.7 An examina-
tion of the decisions highlights the court's inability to enunciate
j'clearly the lesser included offense rule in Pennsylvania.
1. Voluntary Manslaughter.-Under Pennsylvania common-
law, on an indictment charging murder a jury could convict the de-
fendant of voluntary manslaughter, but the instruction was within
the trial judge's discretion. This rule also provided, as it currently
occurring, the court found the conviction of the lesser offense valid because the indictment
alleged the requisite assault. Cf. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 140 Pa. 561, 564, 21 A. 501, 502
(189 1) ("Both adultery and rape include the offense of fornication; it is necessarily involved in
them: bastardy is not necessarily involved, but it may be").
68. Whether conviction for a less serious or less culpable offense may lie on an in-
dictment for another more serious or more culpable crime is principally a question of
whether the indictment will fairly put the defendant on notice of the charges against
him, so that he may prepare an adequate defense.
227 Pa. Super. Ct. at 281 n.3, 324 A.2d at 481 n.3.
69. Commonwealth v. Wilds, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 278, 288, 362 A.2d 273, 278 (1976).
70. See note 7 supra.
71. Because of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's exclusive jurisdiction over murder ap-
peals, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 722 (Purdon 1978), the superior court has not considered the
criminal homicide line of cases.
provides, that a jury may convict a defendant of voluntary man-
slaughter on an indictment for murder even in the absence of facts
evidencing provocation and passion. Thus, by reason of historical
exception, the rule does not require a rational basis in the evidence.72
Not until 1974, in Commonwealth v. Jones,7 3 did the supreme
court decide that an instruction for voluntary manslaughter is not
discretionary with the trial judge, but must be given upon request of
the defendant. 74 The lesser included offense doctrine does not whol-
ly account for the rule in Jones because, unlike jury instructions for
all other lesser offenses, the voluntary manslaughter instruction is
mandatory on request of defendant regardless of a lack of a rational
basis in the evidence. The "historically recognized mercy dispensing
power" 75 of a jury, rather than the lesser included offense rule, pro-
vides the rationale for this position.
The Jones court held, nevertheless, that voluntary manslaughter
was a lesser included offense of murder and thus confused the doc-
trine further. The court stated that the essence of the crime of volun-
tary manslaughter is a killing and that the passion and the
provocation involved are merely the manner of the killing. Thus,
they emphasized the type of harm inflicted by the defendant and not
his state of mind when he inflicted the harm.
76
This explanation of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included
offense of murder is not consistent with the traditional statutory ap-
proach taken by the court. Passion and provocation are certainly
elements of the lesser offense that are not necessarily included in the
greater. The court should have grounded its reasoning not in the
lesser included offense doctrine, but totally in the separate history of
the common-law, 77 since it continued to adhere to the statutory ap-
proach.
2. Involuntary Manslaughter.-Historically, involuntary man-
slaughter was not a lesser included offense of any degree of murder
in Pennsylvania. 78 Yet, under the approach used by the Jones court,
involuntary manslaughter bears the same relation to murder that
voluntary manslaughter does. Although only the state of mind dif-
72. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974) (equally divided
court) (opinion in support of affirmance), ceri. denied, 419 U.S. 1000 (1974), for a history of the
origin of this rule.
73. 457 Pa. 563, 319 A.2d 142 (1974) (equally divided court).
74. The court, however, refused to overturn defendant's conviction for first degree mur-
der, holding that the refusal to instruct on voluntary manslaughter was harmless error since the
jury had the power to return a verdict for second degree murder but did not. Id
75. Id at 572, 319 A.2d at 148.
76. Id
77. The opinion in support of affirmance traces the history of manslaughter as a chargea-
ble offense of murder to the fifteenth century. Id at 566-572, 319 A.2d at 144-47. See also
Hilands v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 372, 6 A. 267 (1886); Hunter v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 503
(1875); Commonwealth v. Gable, 7 Serg. & Rawl. 423 (Pa. 1821).
78. See. e.g., Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 439 Pa. 348, 266 A.2d 726 (1970); Common-
fers between involuntary manslaughter and the more culpable homi-
cides, the supreme court refused to apply its voluntary manslaughter
rationale and continued to hold that involuntary manslaughter is not
a lesser included offense of murder.79
Recently, inroads against the arbitrary distinction between vol-
untary and involuntary manslaughter as lesser included offenses of
murder have occurred. In Commonwealth v. Moore,8" for example,
the supreme court held that a trial court's refusal to consolidate for
trial an indictment charging murder and an indictment charging in-
voluntary manslaughter violated Pennsylvania's compulsory joinder
rule.8 Justice Roberts concurred that a consolidation of the indict-
ments was required, but based his conclusion on the lesser included
offense doctrine.82 He acknowledged that his "research [had] uncov-
ered no Pennsylvania statute, rule, or case which propounds a stan-
dard for determining when an offense is included within a greater
offense" and proposed that Model Penal Code Section 1.07(4) be
adopted by the court.83
Not until 1977, in the companion cases of Commonwealth v.
Polimeni8 4 and Commonwealth v. Garcia,85 did the court accept in-
wealth v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 431 Pa. 44, 244
A.2d 683 (1968); Commonwealth v. Soudani, 398 Pa. 546, 159 A.2d 687 (1960).
In view of the traditional statutory approach to lesser included offenses, this rule is not
surprising. Involuntary manslaughter requires that death result from the doing of an unlawful
act or lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner. None of these elements are encom-
passed within any degree of murder, and, therefore, involuntary manslaughter is not "neces-
sarily included" within any murder offense.
The reasoning employed in the voluntary manslaughter cases, that the essence of the of-
fense is a killing and only the manner of the killing is different, is equally valid here. Only the
divergent histories of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter can explain the inconsistency.
79. See note 77 supra.
80. 463 Pa. 317, 344 A.2d 850 (1975) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court).
81. Id at 320, 344 A.2d at 852. See generally note 52 supra.
82. Justice Roberts perceived two different ways in which voluntary manslaughter is a
lesser included offense of murder.
First, the evidence may persuade the jury that the defendant is guilty of murder in all
respects except that the unjustified risk disregarded was merely substantial and not
extremely high. Second, the evidence may persuade the jury that the defendant is
guilty of murder in all respects except that the defendant did not, but should have,
preceived the risk to others.
Id at 331, 344 A.2d at 857-58.
83. Id at 324-25, 344 A.2d at 854. See notes 31-42 and accompanying text supra.
Under subsection (c) of Section 1.07(4), involuntary manslaughter is a constituent offense
of murder because it "differs from [murder] only in the respect that a less serious ... risk of
injury to the same person . . . or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commis-
sion." 463 Pa. at 331, 344 A.2d at 858, quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(c) (Proposed
Official Draft, 1962). The reasoning is analogous to the rationale used in the voluntary man-
slaughter situation: the offenses differ only in terms of state of mind or degree of culpability.
See notes 72-77 and accompanying text supra.
84. 474 Pa. 430, 378 A.2d 1189 (1977) (opinion announcing the judgment of the court).
Chief Justice Eagen joined in the opinion announcing the judgment of the court; Justice Rob-
erts, joined by Justice O'Brien, concurred for reasons stated in the plurality opinion in Com-
monwealth v. Garcia, 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977); Justice Manderino filed a concurring
opinion; Justice Nix dissented for reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in Garcia.
85. 474 Pa. 449, 378 A.2d 1199 (1977) (plurality opinion). Justice Roberts, joined by
voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. In
Polimemn, the trial court refused the defendant's request for an invol-
untary manslaughter charge on an indictment for murder. Justice
Pomeroy, announcing the judgment of the court, stated that when an
indictment charges murder and evidence is present that would per-
mit the jury to return a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaugh-
ter, a defendant is entitled, upon request, to an instruction on the
latter offense.86
Justice Pomeroy added even more confusion to an already com-
plex situation, however, by ignoring the preexisting lesser included
offense rule and basing his decision on the novel deduction that the
structure of the homicide chapter of the Crimes Code87 requires
such a ruling.88 Because the Crimes Code encompasses all types of
killings within the general offense of criminal homicide,89 Justice
Pomeroy concluded that the legislature intended to make "all grades
of unlawful killing . . . lesser included offenses of the overall crime
of criminal homicide."9 He reasoned that the legislature had
demonstrated its intent by formulating the offense so that "[t]he dif-
ferences between the classifications are largely a function of the state
of mind of the perpetrator."'"
Reliance on the structure of the Crimes Code could be a damag-
ing precedent because every substantive crime is contained within a
chapter, and not every offense within those chapters is a lesser of-
fense of the dominant crime. Justice Pomeroy's attention to levels of
culpability, however, appears closely related to the language and ra-
tionale of Model Penal Code Section 1.07(4)(c), which, in fact, was
cited in support of the Polimeni reasoning.92
Justices O'Brien and Manderino, filed the plurality opinion; Justice Pomeroy concurred as set
forth in his opinion in Polimeni; Chief Justice Eagen concurred in the result; Justice Nix filed a
dissenting opinion.
86. 474 Pa. at 436, 378 A.2d at 1196.
87. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2501 -2505 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
88. Although the court did not base its holding on the common-law concept of man-
slaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, it did suggest that the result could have been
reached through the application of that concept. 474 Pa. at 437-38, 378 A.2d at 1193.
89. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (Purdon 1973) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly
or negligently causes the death of another human being.
(b) Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or in-
voluntary manslaughter.
Section 2501 is adopted from MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.1 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962). The commentary to § 210.1, contained in MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.1, Comment
(Tent. Draft 9, 1959), explains that the purpose of the section is to determine "which of the
kinds of culpability ought to suffice for liability and what distinctions among criminal homi-
cides should be drawn for purposes of sentence." Id at 25.
90. 474 Pa. at 440, 378 A.2d at 1194-1195.
91. Id. at440,378 A.2dat 1195.
92. "We note that the General Assembly, although adopting portions of the Model Penal
The plurality in Garcia, a coalition of those justices who con-
curred in the result in Polimeni,93 explicitly advocated adoption of
Section 1.07(4) as the lesser included offense rule in Pennsylvania
and interpreted the criminal homicide chapter of the Crimes Code in
light of this section.94 The plurality utilized the reasoning employed
in Justice Roberts' concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Moore95
and found that involuntary manslaughter differs from murder only
in terms of culpability and, therefore, under Section 1.07(4), the for-
mer is a lesser included offense of the latter.
96
The Garcia plurality also found the alternative language of Sec-
tion 1.07(4)(c) applicable: involuntary manslaughter is a lesser in-
cluded offense of murder because it differs from murder in that "a
less serious . . . risk of injury to the same person . . . suffices to
establish its commission. 97 The plurality also reasoned that third
degree murder exists when "the defendant 'consciously disregard[s]
an unjustified and extremely high risk that his actions might cause
death. . .' "9' The recklessness and grossly negligent conduct essen-
tial to a conviction for involuntary manslaughter occur when the risk
the actor disregards or fails to perceive constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of reasonable care. 99
Code into the Crimes Code, did not incorporate § 1.07(4) of the Model Code. We do not,
however, consider this a mark of disapprobation of the Model Code formulation of the doc-
trine of lesser included offenses." 474 Pa. at 438 n.6, 378 A.2d at 1193 n.6.
93. See notes 84-85 supra.
94. The plurality opinion in Garcia, like Justice Pomeroy's opinion in Po/imeni made an
inquiry into the legislative intent behind the structuring of the criminal homicide chapter of
the Crimes Code. Unlike the opinion in Polimen, however, the plurality opinion in Garcia did
not find that involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder based on the
structure of the chapter. Rather, because the chapter classifies all killings as criminal homi-
cides, the Garcia court inferred that the legislature no longer intended to adhere to the com-
mon-law view that involuntary manslaughter is not a permissible verdict on an indictment for
murder. 474 Pa. at 459-60, 378 A.2d at 1204-05.
95. 463 Pa. 317, 344 A.2d 850 (1975) (equally divided court).
96. See notes 80-83 and accompanying text supra.
97. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(c) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
98. 474 Pa. at 463, 378 A.2d at 1206-07, quoting Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557,
565-66, 337 A.2d 545, 549 (1975).
In addition, the plurality found involuntary manslaughter a lesser included offense of
murder under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 302(e) (Purdon 1973), which states, "When the law
provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is
established if the person acts intentionally or knowingly." Applying § 302(e), the plurality
stated that involuntary manslaughter is, by definition, a constituent offense of all greater homi-
cide offenses. The plurality's interpretation of § 302(e) is criticized in Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 482 Pa. 312, 393 A.2d 1122 (1978) (equally divided court). Justice Pomeroy, joined
by Chief Justice Eagen, asserted that
Section 302(e) was never intended to abrogate the settled concept that one may,
under the evidence, be either guilty of a higher offense or not guilty of any of-
fense. . . . Section 302(e) of the Crimes Code, as I read it, is applicable only in cases
where, despite evidence that might warrant a conviction for a higher offense, a prose-
cutor chooses instead to prosecute for a lesser offense only.
Id at 324 n.8, 393 A.2d at 1128 n.8. In other words, if a defendant is indicted for manslaugh-
ter, and the evidence proves a murder, defendant may not claim a failure of proof required for
a conviction on the manslaughter.
99. "The evidence may persuade the jury that the defendant is guilty of murder in all
The rationale in Garcia is meritorious in three respects. First,
the plurality's recommendation and adoption of a lesser included of-
fense rule is an action not previously taken by Pennsylvania courts.
Thus, an effort has been made to end the inconsistency that previ-
ously plagued the doctrine in Pennsylvania law. Second, the princi-
ple underlying Model Penal Code Section 1.07(4)(c) reconciles the
common-law rationale applied in the voluntary manslaughter situa-
tion with a modern and coherent rule: offenses that differ only in
terms of state of mind of the defendant may be a lesser and greater
offense. Last, the Model Penal Code rule is consistent with already
existing case law because subsection (a) of the rule encompasses the
statutory theory. "
Although neither Polimeni nor Garcia constitute a majority de-
cision, at least five members of the court subscribe to the theory that
involuntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.' 0
More significantly, at least four, and possibly five, justices "were pre-
pared to be guided by Section 1.07(4) of the Model Penal Code"'0 2
and appeared to adopt Section 1.07(4) as the lesser included offense
rule in Pennsylvania.
respects except that the risk disregarded was not extremely high, but that the risk was still
unjustified and that therefore the killing constitutes involuntary manslaughter." 474 Pa. at
464, 378 A.2d at 1207. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 302(b)(3) - (4) (Purdon 1973).
100. See note 33 supra.
101. An essential difference existed between the Polimeni and Garcia factions of the court.
In Piolimeni. Justice Pomeroy maintained that, unlike voluntary manslaughter, no automatic
entitlement to an instruction for involuntary manslaughter exists. Moreover, a rational basis in
the evidence is required before a judge may instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter.
This is the conventional requirement for lesser included offenses. See notes 45-49 and accom-
panying text supra.
The Garcia plurality does not require a rational basis in the evidence because they believe
that "the evidence would support an involuntary manslaughter verdict whenever it would sup-
port a murder or voluntary manslaughter verdict .. " 474 Pa. at 465, 378 A.2d at 1208.
Subsequently, neither position has garnered a majority vote. See Commonwealth v. Thomas,
482 Pa. 312, 393 A.2d 1122 (1978) (equally divided court); Commonwealth v. Terrell, 482 Pa.
303, 393 A.2d 1117 (1978) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Dussinger, 478 Pa. 182. 386
A.2d 500 (1978) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Gartner, 475 Pa. 512, 381 A.2d 114
(1977) (plurality opinion); Commonwealth v. Smith, 474 Pa. 559, 379 A.2d 96 (1977) (two
justices not participating). In Commonwealth v. Dickinson, 482 Pa. 517, 394 A.2d 442 (1978),
however, four members of the court affirmed per curiam a trial judge's refusal to charge a jury
on involuntary manslaughter on a murder indictment.
Apparently, with the addition of Justice Larsen to the bench, the Polimeni position is
precedental law. The five justices subscribing to the view that involuntary manslaughter is a
lesser included offense of murder are Justices Pomeroy, O'Brien, Roberts, Eagen, and Mander-
ino. Justice Larsen's position on the issue has not yet been determined.
102. Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 283 n.9, 393 A.2d 660, 664 n.9 (1978) (Pome-
roy, J., dissenting). The plurality in Garcia, Justices Roberts, O'Brien, and Manderino. advo-
cated adoption of§ 1.07(4). In Polimeni. Justice Pomeroy, joined by Justice Eagen, noted that
although § 1.07(4) was not adopted by the legislature, neither did they believe that the legisla-
ture intended to disapprove the section. See note 92 supra. Additionally, Justice Pomeroy,
dissenting in Carter, appears to explicitly favor adoption of § 1.07(4). Id at 279-90, 393 A.2d
at 662-68.
D. Commonwealth P. Carter and the Status of Model Penal Code
Section 1.07(4)
In Commonwealth v. Carter, 3 decided only one year after Gar-
cia, the majority of the court inexplicably overlooked or ignored its
previously stated adherence to Section 1.07(4) as the lesser included
offense rule in Pennsylvania. In Carter, the superior court affirmed a
conviction for criminal trespass following a grand jury indictment
for burglary."° The supreme court reversed and, apparently re-
turning to the strict statutory approach, held that criminal trespass is
not a lesser included offense of burglary. 0 5 The court explained that
because criminal trespass contains one legal element that burglary
does not, the former is not necessarily included in the latter. A crim-
inal trespass occurs when a person knowingly enters a building or
structure that he is not licensed or privileged to enter, 0 6 but burglary
requires an unlicensed or unprivileged entry into a building with the
intent to commit a crime therein.'0 7 Therefore, the court interpreted
criminal trespass to contain a scienter element that burglary did
not. 108
Obviously, the court applied a strict statutory approach al-
though it did not state the rule or cite any previous lesser included
offense decision utilizing that theory. Inexplicably, the court failed
to mention Model Penal Code Section 1.07(4) or explain why it ap-
plied one lesser included offense rule in 1977 and another in 1978. 1o9
The dissenting opinion in Carter questioned the inconsistency
between the majority opinion and the position apparently taken by
the court in the involuntary manslaughter cases. The dissent stated
that it was under the impression that the court adopted Section
1.07(4) as the lesser included offense rule in Pennsylvania"o and ac-
curately pointed out that criminal trespass is a lesser included offense
of burglary under subsection (c) of Section 1.07(4) because the two
103. 482 Pa. 274, 393 A.2d 660 (1978).
104. 236 Pa. Super. Ct. 376, 344 A.2d 899 (1975) (plurality opinion).
105. 482 Pa. 274, 393 A.2d 660 (1978).
106. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3503(a) (Purdon 1973).
107. Id § 3502(a).
108.
Scienter is not an element of [burglary] and thus, one defending against a burglary
charge would have no reason to establish that (albeit falsely) he believed his presence
in a building or occupied structure was privileged or licensed. . . . These convictions
for an offense not included in any offense charged and for which there was no indict-
ment violate due process.
482 Pa. at 277-78, 393 A.2d at 661.
109. Interestingly, both the majority opinion in Carter and the plurality opinion in Garcia
were written by Justice Roberts.
110. The dissent began by noting, "To those lower courts and practitioners who supposed
that this Court was willing to be guided by Section 1.07(4) of the American Law Institutes'
Model Penal Code in solving the problems presented in the area of lesser included offenses,
today's decision will come as a surprise." 482 Pa. at 279, 393 A.2d at 662 (Pomeroy, J., dissent-
ing).
offenses differ "only in that a less serious injury or risk of injury to
the same . . . property . . . suffices to establish its commission."'' I
Because there is no intent to commit a crime after entry in criminal
trespass, a less serious risk to the same property is present.
1 2
The dissent reasoned that criminal trespass is a lesser included
offense of burglary not only through application of Section 1.07(4)
but also through the conventional strict statutory approach. Apply-
ing the statutory approach, the dissent noted that burglary and crim-
inal trespass statutes differ only in the burden of production of
evidence required on the part of the Commonwealth because crimi-
nal trespass requires proof of scienter but burglary does not."t 3 Ac-
cording to the dissent, "[It has not. . . been adopted as a hard-and-
fast rule in this Commonwealth" that a difference in burden of pro-
duction of evidence between two offenses prevents one from being
necessarily included in the other."
14
The dissenters' argument highlights the inadequacy of the strict
statutory approach, which here evolves into a word game focused
upon the role the word "knowingly" plays. The inflexibility of the
approach is painfully clear because the majority admitted that the
evidence adduced at trial showed a knowing, unlicensed or un-
privileged entry.' Nevertheless, the court, under the strict statutory
approach, could not find the defendant guilty of criminal trespass." 16
Under the majority's view, if the Commonwealth fails to prove at a
trial for burglary an intent to commit a crime after the entry, despite
clear evidence of a criminal intrusion, the defendant must go free. 11
7
Strong evidence indicates that the legislature intended criminal
trespass to be a lesser included offense of burglary. The burglary
and criminal trespass sections are based on substantially similar pro-
visions in the Model Penal Code." 8 The commentary to the Model
Penal Code states, "If there is a reasonable doubt as to the criminal
purpose of the intruder [under a burglary indictment], it should be
enough to convict him of criminal trespass .... , 19
The dissent suggested that the majority's interpretation of crimi-
nal trespass is a result of inartful drafting of the statute. 120 Nonethe-
111. Id at 287, 393 A.2d at 667 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
112. Id
113. The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of license
and privilege to enter before a defendant may be found guilty of burglary, and must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt knowledge of the absence of license or privilege to enter in order to
convict him of criminal trespass. Id at 281-82, 393 A.2d at 663-64 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 282, 393 A.2d at 664.
115. Id at 278, 393 A.2d at 662.
116. Id
117. Burglary and criminal trespass are presently the only offenses in the Crimes Code
that protect against criminal intrusions onto property.
118. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.2 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
119. Id., Comment at 60 (Tent. Draft No. II, 1960).
120. 482 Pa. at 288-89, 393 A.2d at 667 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). See also note 27 supra.
less, the majority's application of the strict statutory approach
creates two problems. First, its inflexibility is antithetical to the ap-
parent intent of the legislature in promulgating the statutes in ques-
tion. Second, the decision, like others before it, confuses rather than
clarifies the lesser included offense rule in Pennsylvania. The court
not only ignores Section 1.07(4), a rule it previously adopted, but
also does little to clarify the parameters of the statutory approach.' 2 '
The status of the superior court's forays into the pleadings and evi-
dence theories, as well as the status of Section 1.07(4), remains am-
biguous.
V. Recommendations
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court employed two different rules
in its most recent lesser included offense decisions. The effect of the
latter decision, Carter, on the former decision, Garcia, is unclear, as
indeed is the entire lesser included offense doctrine in Penn-
sylvania. 122 In order to avoid this contradiction the supreme court or
the legislature must advance a definitive standard compatible with
the principle underlying the lesser included offense doctrine so that
judges and trial counsel may be guided by a consistent rule.
The basic problem with the strict statutory approach is its inher-
ent inflexibility. The meaning of words rather than the nature of
offenses is the paramount inquiry. This approach subverts the basic
function of the doctrine, to aid the prosecution and defense. Fur-
thermore, the court has never adequately defined the strict statutory
approach. This inadequacy is evident in the superior court's incon-
sistent application of the lesser included offense doctrine.
In addition, neither the evidence nor the pleadings theory is ad-
equate. The pleadings theory embraces only those lesser offenses
that appear implicitly in the indictment. This theory, therefore, ex-
cludes many lesser offenses that relate to the greater crime by con-
ception or nature. The evidence approach entails many of the same
shortcomings as the strict statutory approach because both require
one offense to be necessarily included in another offense. Although
121. In Carter, the court noted that it would not allow the "accidental presence" in the
record of the missing legal element of the greater offense to cure the due process infringement
that occurs when a defendant is convicted of an offense of which he has no notice. 482 Pa. at
278, 393 A.2d at 662. Whether an evidence approach is totally abrogated by this dictum is
unclear, because not only may the presence of the evidence be intentional rather than acciden-
tal, but also the defendant rather than the prosecution may desire the lesser included offense
charge. In this situation, no due process infringement can occur, because if the defendant
requests an instruction on the offense, he impliedly admits he has notice of the offense.
122. Certainly Carter was not meant to overrule the holding in Garcia, that involuntary
manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder. Nevertheless, applying the Carter stan-
dard, involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of murder because it contains
elements, recklessness and negligence, that murder does not.
the evidence approach does examine factual rather than legal ele-
ments, it, nevertheless, fails to consider the nature of offenses.
The Model Penal Code approach provides the flexibility the
statutory and pleadings theories lack. Subsection (c) of Section
1.07(4) scrutinizes the actual relationship between crimes in order to
decide whether two offenses are lesser and greater. This flexibility
benefits the prosecution because fewer wrongdoers may go free.
Moreover, the prosecution may also avoid the dilemma of being
forced to over-indict a defendant when it believes it may fail to
prove an element essential to the defendant's conviction. Over-in-
dicting is a tactic that courts believe unduly prejudices juries against
defendants.'23 Defendants also benefit from a naturalistic approach
because they may be convicted of an offense that provides for a
lesser punishment and conforms more closely to the criminal acts for
which they stand trial.
Ironically, the only foreseeable objection to Section 1.07(4) re-
sults from its very flexibility. A lesser offense under subsection (c)
may not be readily apparent, and due process requires that a defend-
ant have notice of the charges against him so that he may have an
opportunity to defend. 124 The notice can be provided in two ways.
First, offenses that differ from one another only in respect to degree
or risk of injury or type of culpability are placed in the same chapter
in the Crimes Code. Offenses that fall within the purview of subsec-
tion (c) should generally appear in the same chapter. Thus, trial
counsel will not have to search the entire Crimes Code in order to
determine which crimes stand in the relationship of greater and
lesser offense. Moreover, since the Crimes Code contains fewer of-
fenses than the former penal code a multiplicity of offenses based on
one greater offense is unlikely.
In addition, once the supreme court decides that two crimes are
lesser and greater offenses under subsection (c), the judiciary and the
bar will be on notice of that holding. Although the court may decide
that the first defendant to appeal a conviction based on a specific
lesser offense under subsection (c) had no notice to defend against
that crime, subsequent defendants cannot make the same claim be-
cause both the indictment and case law will provide adequate no-
tice. 125
123. A secondary role of lesser included offenses is to prevent prosecutors from over-in-
dicting in order to prejudice the jury through the number of offenses charged in the indictment
or to coerce plea bargaining. See Commonwealth v. Nace, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 329, 295 A.2d 87
(1972). See also ABA PROJECT ON THE STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
§ 3.9(c) (Approved Draft 1971).
124. See notes 1-2 supra.
125. See Commonwealth v. Carter, 482 Pa. 274, 290 n. 20, 393 A.2d 660, 668 n.20 (1978)
(Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
Because the Pennsylvania legislature, in effect, adopted the bulk
of the Model Penal Code, Section 1.07(4) conforms to the design of
the Crimes Code.'26 Although several members of the supreme
court earlier declared a willingness to be guided by Section
1.07(4), 127 they unaccountably retreated from this position in Carter.
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not prepared to clarify the
lesser included offense rule, the legislature should adopt Model Pe-
nal Code Section 1.07(4).
V. Conclusion
As a result of the conflicting proclamations on lesser included
offenses at all court levels in Pennsylvania, defendants do not know
what rule to apply in order to prepare a defense or to gain a lesser
included offense instruction. The lack of a definitive rule places a
prosecutor's case in similar jeopardy. In view of the instrinsic value
of the doctrine, Pennsylvania should adopt the approach to lesser
included offenses that best complements the purpose that the doc-
trine serves. Since Pennsylvania recently abandoned a penal code
based on common-law crimes and adopted a cohesive and organized
Crimes Code, now is an opportune time to similarly abandon a lesser
included offense approach that is as old as the common-law and
adopted a rule that comports with the Crimes Code.
STUART S. YUSEM
126. Subsection (a) is in harmony with the existing strict statutory approach in Penn-
sylvania; crimes not encompassed by subsection (c) may still be lesser included offenses by
utilization of subsection (a). Subsection (b), which provides that attempt and solicitation to
commit a crime are lesser included offenses of that crime, differs from Pennsylvania law, which
regards solicitation as a distinct substantive offense. See notes 32-34 supra.
127. See note 102 supra.
